A Simple Solution To The Afghanistan Problem

The simple way forward in Afghanistan is to grant General McChrystal’s request and send in 40—50—60 thousand more troops. But wait, McChrystal’s report says that focusing only on more resources (troops) misses the point. What is necessary, McChrysal says, is the implementation of a new strategy, which his report lays out in detail. Unfortunately, one of the details this reports lacks, is a solid estimate for how long this new strategy would take. And the report admits that even this new strategy does not ensure success.

Before anyone bites on this simple solution, they need to watch Richard Engel’s documentary “Tip of the Spear,” in which he and his crew capture the battle from the perspective of an advanced front line unit in Afghanistan (If you can’t find a repeat on MSNBC, much of the material is available at youtube.com: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i9XV07D17-Q. It clearly shows the difficulty of the combat (immense) but also provides hints about the social difficulty of the war. 

From a purely military point of view, the geography of the region makes combat difficult in the extreme. The terrain offers endless cover for attacking forces, and it is hard to kill an enemy you cannot see. During fire fights our forces have to fire in the direction they think enemy fire is coming from with few specific targets, and steep slopes prevent any attempt to close on the enemy. US patrols of the area are best at finding where the enemy has been. (This is not a criticism of our soldiers or their training. The Taliban are fighting with a home field advantage and are able to melt into the countryside. They are also not uniformed combatants.)

On the social side of the war, the local residents—most of which are Sunni Muslim Pashtuns (or Pakhtuns as they prefer to be known) do not overly object to Taliban rule. Rural villagers have little connection to central government, and little sense of nationalism. Their loyalty is to their religion, their tribe and their village. The Taliban version of Islamic law (Sharia) is somewhat more repressive than the mainstream interpretations, but not drastically so, and it is not foreign as our law is. It is likely the people will support whoever came give them peace and security.

To them we represent neither peace nor security; we are a threat. When American soldiers are not physically present, members of the Taliban are capable of infiltrating the villages at will and beating or killing villagers thought to have collaborated with American forces.

Under McChrystal’s plan we must reverse this. We must become the force best able to provide security to the population, and we must help them develop a since of identify that includes loyalty to Afghanistan and the concept of a central government. That is a tall order indeed, requiring a large increase in troop strength as well as a massive country building effort over a long period of time. And even with this we may still be seen as an occupying force and the central government as our tool.

So the simple solution is to simply bring our troops home. Maybe we could send everyone in Afghanistan a funny card from the Hallmark “Sorry We Invaded Your Country” series, pack our bags and catch the next bus out. Since there is currently little Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan, we could even declare that our mission there was largely a success, and we could leave a note for any future Afghanistan government telling them we will feel free to drop in again if we detect a renewed Al Qaeada presence.

But as we move out, we can be certain that the Taliban will move in, and they are not nice people. While, as noted above, the rural Pashtuns may not overly object to Taliban rule, Pashtuns only account for about 40% of the country’s population. There are doubtless many, particularly in the Urban areas, who would find living under 8^th and 9^th century Islamic law less than comfortable.

We will be abandoning our allies and other more modern people of Afghanistan to a harsh fate. And despite any warning against allowing Al Qaeada to reestablish itself inside Afghanistan, the Taliban may well it and other anti-west terrorist groups with open arms. If we allow the Taliban to overwhelm the current Afghanistan government, we may be allowing the establishment of an enemy state we will be dealing with for years to come.

So maybe there is no simple solution to the Afghanistan problem. Maybe that is why President Obama has not rushed to embrace either course. I for one hope he takes his time, studies all the possible options—including new strategies requiring both more and fewer troops—and in the end can enunciate a new vision of our goals and an exit strategy. I wish him the best, because I see little hope for our involvement not ending in tears.